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hearing a divorce case involving children.3 3 Certainly all the children
in this state who will have their lives affected by a divorce decree
deserve the opportunity to have presented to the court a fair and dis-
passionate account of all the factors which will have a bearing on
their ultimate custody disposition. Therefore, the "friend of the court"
should be required to investigate all divorce cases affecting children.
Since some counties may not alone be able to bear the financial burden
of hiring a "friend of the court", it might be advisable to allow the
counties in a circuit court district to share the expense, especially
where the divorce docket would not justify a full-time "friend" in all
the counties of the district. In any event the ultimate benefits to be
derived by children of divorced parents and by the state and its coun-
ties might more than offset the expense of the office.34
Caims N. CAMs
DIVORCE - DOES RECRIMINATION REMAIN IN KENTUCKY?
In most states the fact that the complainant in an action for
divorce has been guilty of conduct which would constitute a ground
for divorce affords the defendant an adequate defense to the action.1
This defense, referred to as the doctrine of recrimination, is most
simply defined by the oft-repeated statement that if both parties have
a right to a divorce neither has. This principle has often been criticised
as too harsh,2 and as a result, some states have passed statutes which
limit its application in several different ways.3
"3 MICH. Com'. LAws sec. 552.251 (1949) provides for a friend of the
court for all counties who must see that all decrees effecting children are properly
followed, and the chancellor may call upon him to make an investigation and sub-
mit recommendations during the original action. 1 ILL. BEv. STAT. c. 28 sec. 438
(1947) allows the chancellor to call upon the County Welfare Department to
make such an investigation.
'For a comprehensive treatment of the problem see Children of Divorced
Parents; A Symposium, 10 LAw ANm CoNTEmP. PROB 697-866 (1944) and see
Cochran, Children of Divorce, 11 Ky. B. J. 201 (1947).
'Brazell v. Brazell, 54 Cal. App. 2d 458. 129 P. 2d 117 (1942); McMillan
v. McMillan, 120 Fla. 209, 162 So. 524 (1935); Smiley v. Smiley, 114 Ind.
App. 138, 51 N.E. 2d 98 (1943); Rigsby v. Rigsby, 266 Ky. 291, 97 S.W.
2d 835 (1936); Boyd v. Boyd, 177 Md. 687, 11 A. 2d 461 (1940); Reddington
v. Reddington, 317 Mass. 760, 59 N.E. 2d 775 (1945); Tebbe v. Tebbe, 223 Mo.
App. 1106, 21 S.W. 2d 915 (1929); Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 263 N.W.
139 (1935); Cilente v. Cifente, 104 N.J. Eq. 605, 146 Ad. 469 (1929); Weiger v.
Weiger, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 444 (1946); Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322, 193
N.E. 657 (1935); Gray v. Gray, 232 Wis. 400, 287 N.W. 708 (1939).
'Note, 36 Ky. L. J. 342.
'For a comparison of statutes of 32 states, see 2 VmmnmR AammucN FNr=y
LAws 82 (1932).
NoTEs AND CozNnrs
In Kentucky, as in most states, it is not necessary that the re-
criminatory acts pleaded by the defendant spouse be of the same
character and furnish the same grounds for divorce as those relied
upon in the complaint.4 For example, if a husband sues for divorce
on ground of his wife's adultery, it should not be granted when he
himself is guilty of cruel treatment sufficient to warrant the granting
of an absolute divorce to the wife.5
The doctrine of recrimination is based on the maxim of equity that
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.6 This clean
hands doctrine extends to two types of cases in divorce law: (1)
where plaintiff has provoked the conduct of which he complains, and
(2) where plaintiff is himself guilty of conduct constituting a ground
for divorce. 7 The latter is recrimination, the former is the defense of
provocation. These two defenses sometimes overlap, for conduct which
amounts to a ground for divorce might also be conduct which provoked
the defendant's acts. In such a case, in Kentucky, it would make no
difference which defense the defendant pleaded. The one important
difference between the two defenses is that if the defense is provoca-
tion, the courts will compare the fault of the parties, and if the plaintiff
is less at fault, his divorce will be granted.8 If the defense is recrimina-
tion, the courts will not compare the fault of the parties because no
difference in degree of wrong in different statutory grounds for divorce
is recognized. 9 So if provocation was relied upon as a defense where
the provoking act complained of amounted to a ground for divorce, the
parties would be considered equally to blame and the divorce would
be denied.
An exception to the rule that neither party will be granted a
divorce where each proves a right to a divorce seems to have been
made in a recent Kentucky case, Shofner v. Shofner.10 There the plain-
tiff sought a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment,
'Smith v. Smith. 181 Ky. 55, 203 S.W. 884 (1918).
'Smith v. Smith, supra note 4
'Hartstern v. Hartstern, 311 Ky. 564, 224 S.W. 2d 447 (1949).
'McMillan v. McMillan, 113 Wash. 250, 193 P. 673 (1920) citing NELsoN,
DIVORCE AND SEPA ATION.
" Dixie Gadie Hoagland v. John W. Hoagland, 218 Ky. 636, 291 S.W. 1044
(1927). In this case the plaintiff sued for divorce on the ground of cruel and in-
human treatment, and the defendant cross-petitioned, alledging lewd and lascivious
conduct on the part of the plaintiff. After finding that plaintiff was not guilty of
acts sufficient to grant a divorce to defendant, but finding that plaintiff's acts
provoked defendant's acts of cruelty, the court said: "Both of these parties were
to blame for their unfortunate domestic trouble, and in such cases neither of
them is entitled to an absolute divorce unless the blame of one is so much greater
and out of proportion to that of the other that the misdoings of the latter would
not furnish sufficient provocation for the one guilty of the excess.
'Rigsby v. Rigsby, 266 Ky. 291, 97 S.W. 2d 835 (1936).
"310 Ky. 869, 222 S.W. 2d 933 (1949).
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and defendant by counter-claim sought a divorce on the same ground.
The lower court granted an absolute divorce to each party and de-
fendant appealed from the award of alimony to the wife. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, saying:
"It appears to us from this record that the husband was
more at fault, and alimony was correctly allowed to the wife."'
The court did not comment on the doctrine of recrimination, and
impliedly at least, seemed to accept the granting of an absolute divorce
to each party as the usual practice. This may be explained by the
fact that the Court of Appeals cannot reverse that portion of a judg-
ment granting a divorce, 12 but the correctness of the lower court's
determination on the divorce is an important factor almost invariably
decided upon by the court in reviewing the award of alimony.la
Does the Shofner case represent a trend away from the doctrine of
recrimination? Before considering that question, the ways a court
might escape applying the doctrine should be considered with a view
to determining whether or not there might have been a reason for not
applying the doctrine in the Shofner case.
One way in which the result in the Schofner case might have
been correctly reached would be through a substitution of the prin-
ciple of provocation for the principle of recrimination. Such a sub-
stitution affords the most probable explanation as to why the courts
in the state of Washington have been able to reach the same result as
in the Shofner case, yet stay within their doctrine of recrimination. In
McMillan v. McMillan,14 the plaintiff sued for divorce alleging cruelty.
It was found that the plaintiff's "irregularities" had provoked his wife
into ill-tempered and aggravating conduct towards him. The Supreme
Court of Washington held that he was barred from a divorce by the
doctrine of recrimination, which the court explained as being that a
person seeking a divorce "must be innocent of a substantial wrong
towards the other party of the same nature as that of which the com-
plaint is made." In a later Washington case,' 5 plaintiff sued for a
divorce alleging cruelty, and the defendant proved that plaintiff also
was guilty of cruelty.
Id. at 871, 222 S.W. 2d at 934.
Ahrens v. Ahrens, 313 Ky. 55, 230 S.W. 2d 73 (1950).
"The law is well settled, and indeed is of statutory enactment, that there
can be no appeal from a judgment granting an absolute divorce, but the rule is
firmly fixed in this jurisdiction that although the judgment for divorce may not
be disturbed on appeal, still this court may look into the evidence to see whether
the judgment was authorized under the proof, and if found not to be authorized
the judgment for alimony may be reversed." Stepp v. Stepp, 178 Ky. 337, 338,
198 S.W. 935 (1917).
"113 Wash. 250, 193 P. 673 (1920).
' Hokamp v. Hokamp, 32 Wash. 2d 593, 203 P. 2d 357 (1949).
NoTEs AND Coramrs
The lower court awarded plaintiff an absolute divorce and
offered to award defendant a similar decree if she would recast
her pleadings. The defendant refused, and appealed on the ground
that the doctrine of recrimination should have barred plaintiff from
receiving the divorce. The Supreme Court of Washington, in affirming,
held that recrimination as set out in the McMillan case did not apply.
Thus, in interpreting recrimination as applied in the McMillan case,
the Washington court apparently limited the doctrine to a situation
wherein the plaintiff's misconduct provoked the defendant's acts. The
fact that a plaintiff is guilty of acts constituting a ground for divorce
is immaterial unless these same acts can be said to have provoked
defendant. Kentucky, on the other hand, would apply provocation
where the plaintiff's misconduct provoked the defendant, " and would
reserve recrimination for the situation in which Washington denied its
application-where the plaintiff is guilty of acts constituting a ground
for divorce.
Another means by which a divorce might have been granted would
be through a relaxation of the doctrine of recrimination because of
some peculiar circumstance. An example of this is found in Stepp v.
Stepp.'1 In that case the Kentucky Court, in determining whether the
wife was rightly granted a divorce (a determination made necessary
in connection with an appeal from judgment allowing alimony) cited
the record as showing that Mrs. Stepp had suffered a paralytic stroke
afflicting her mind to some extent. Subsequently she exhibited a
temper, breathing threats against her husband and calling him "in-
elegant" names. In approving the divorce in favor of the wife, the
Court said her conduct amounted to cruelty, but while she probably
would not be entitled to a divorce under ordinary circumstances, her
transgressions should not bar her right to a divorce in view of her
condition. The Court in effect said that, had the husband sued for
divorce on ground of his wife's conduct he would not have been
granted a divorce because the wife's conduct, though amounting to
cruelty under ordinary circumstances, did not amount to cruelty in
view of her condition. In the Shofner case, the husband and wife were
each granted a divorce, so each had to be guilty of acts which
amounted to a ground for divorce. Therefore the approach taken in
the Stepp case could not have been applied in the Shofner case. It
seems improbable that circumstances would ever justify the granting
'Kreidler v. Kreidler, 301 Ky. 105, 190 S.W. 2d 1012 (1945); Grove v.
Grove, 289 Ky. 32, 39 S.W. 2d 193 (1931); Kahr v. Kahr, 199 Ky. 434, 251 S.W.
199 (1923).
" Supra note 13.
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of a divorce to both parties, conceding that they might necessitate
deciding for one party or the other.
About the only other way to avoid the application of recrimination
is by adopting the doctrine of comparative rectitude. Under that
doctrine the court compares the fault of the parties18 and grants a
divorce to the party less at fault. It would not enable a court to award
each party an absolute divorce.
There seems to have been no reason in the Shofner case for not
applying recrimination. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact
that the judgment in the case was contrary to the express provisions of
section 403.020 of the KroCK REmED STATuTES, which limit cruelty
as a ground for divorce to a wife "not in like fault". Disregarding
recrimination entirely, the statute would have barred a divorce to the
wife here. For this same reason it is probable that the Shofner case
does not represent a trend away from recimination. The fact that the
lower court not only failed to apply recrimination as established by
precedent, but also failed to apply the above statute, shows that the
Shofner case probably represents a segregated case of indifference on
the part of the lower court rather than a valid trend away from re-
crimination which might be recognized as precedent in future de-
cisions. As for the apparent acceptance of the lower court's decision
by the Court of Appeals, the most accurate explanation, in all prob-
ability, is the haste with which the Court must dispose of appeals as a
result of its heavy burden. The recent case of Hartstern v. Harstern,9
decided after the Shofner case, shows that the Shofner case has not
lessened the hold of recrimination in Kentucky. In that case the Court
said:
"Recrimination is a complete bar to the right of a party
to obtain a divorce, although he may have established the grounds
supporting his charge by conclusive evidence. It is strictly a plea in
defense of an action, and may be established by showing that the
plaintiff has been guilty of such conduct towards the defendant as,
standing alone, would justify the Court in granting a divorce to the
defendant."-'o
THows P. LEwis
"Roberts v. Roberts, 103 Kan. 65, 173 P. 537 (1918).
S11 Ky. 564, 224 S.W. 2d 447 (1949).
Id. at 567, 224 S.W. 2d at 449.
